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Abstract—Hardware-centric security threats have emerged in
every stage of the IC supply chain. Prior defenses have been
developed to protect against intellectual property (IP) piracy at
different stages. However, so far only logic locking can protect
the IP end to end. We present dynamic camouflaging to thwart
IP reverse engineering at all stages in the supply chain. We
exploit the multi-functionality, post-fabrication reconfigurability,
and run-time polymorphism of spin-based devices, specifically
the magneto-electric spin-orbit (MESO) device. Leveraging these
properties, dynamic camouflaging is resilient to state-of-the-art
attacks such as SAT, approximate SAT (AppSAT) and HackTest,
and can further impede side-channel analysis. For MESO-based
full-chip dynamic camouflaging we anticipate massive improve-
ments in power (7,400x), performance (5.9x), and area (73x) over
spin- and CMOS-based camouflaging. We outline the prospects
of dynamic camouflaging for error-tolerant image processing
applications.
I. INTRODUCTION
GLOBALIZATION of the electronics industry has resultedin the outsourcing of the integrated circuit (IC) supply
chain. Such a distributed supply chain enables intellectual
property (IP) piracy, illegal overproduction of ICs and insertion
of malicious circuits called hardware Trojans [1]. IP piracy,
in particular, is multi-faceted and an attacker has different
avenues to mount such an attack, ranging from an untrustwor-
thy foundry, an untrustworthy test facility to malicious end-
users. While an untrusted foundry or end-user could pirate the
design by reverse engineering (RE) and/or mounting Boolean
satisfiability (SAT) attacks [2], [3], an adversary in the test
facility can misuse test patterns to compromise the security of
a chip [4]–[6]. Various schemes have been proposed to counter
IP piracy:
1) Camouflaging the layout and the devices makes the
circuit implementation indistinguishable across several
functions (e.g., using dummy contacts [7], threshold-
voltage-dependent cells [8], AND-tree camouflaging [9]),
2) Split manufacturing fabricates the front-end-of-line
(FEOL) and back-end-of-line (BEOL) parts of a chip in
different foundries. This avoids dissemination of the full
layout to one untrustworthy foundry (e.g., split manufac-
turing for RF designs [10]),
3) Logic locking uses additional gates to obfuscate the
functionality at the netlist level (e.g., Anti-SAT [11] and
stripped-functionality logic locking [12]).
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TABLE I
COMPARISON OF SECURITY SCHEMES TO PROTECT THE IC SUPPLY CHAIN.
THE PROPOSED DYNAMIC CAMOUFLAGING IS THE first TO PROTECT THE
SUPPLY CHAIN END TO END, IN THE CONTEXT OF IC CAMOUFLAGING.
Technique Foundry Test Facility End-User
Camouflaging 7 7 !
Split Manufacturing ! 7 7
Logic Locking ! ! !
Dynamic Camouflaging ! ! !
Only logic locking protects the IC supply chain end to end.
Even for logic locking, the resilience depends on a tamper-
proof memory to store the secret key. Realizing such memories
is an area of active research [13].
Emerging spin devices like the magneto-electric spin-orbit
logic (MESO) [14] and the charge-spin logic [15] are prime
candidates for augmenting hardware security [16], [17]. This is
due to their innate run-time polymorphism and post-fabrication
reconfigurability. Recent research [18], [19] has used poly-
morphic devices for static camouflaging. However, the true
potential of polymorphic devices lies in dynamic camouflag-
ing, which is unexplored and is the focus of this paper.
Dynamic camouflaging involves switching and obfuscating
the device-level functionality post-fabrication, as well as dur-
ing run-time. We study dynamic camouflaging using polymor-
phic spin devices, and establish security and computational
accuracy as two entangled design variables, especially for
error-tolerant applications such as image processing. For such
applications, dynamic camouflaging can thwart exact [2] and
approximate SAT (AppSAT) attacks [3]. Further, we discuss
securing the supply chain end to end using spin-based de-
vices, and circumventing the risks associated with untrusted
foundries, test facilities, and end-users (see Fig. 1 and Table I).
A. Background and Motivation
Dynamic camouflaging builds on the foundations of poly-
morphic computing [20], a subset of reconfigurable comput-
ing. Reconfigurable computing using programmable devices
such as FPGAs fix the logic functionality of the chip before
run-time. In polymorphic computing, the devices are recon-
figured in time and space during run-time. Dynamic camou-
flaging dynamically obfuscates the circuit at the device level.
Individual gates are configured correctly only after fabrication
and test and can switch between different functionalities at
run-time. Contrary to static camouflaging [7]–[9], dynamic
camouflaging requires polymorphic logic gates.
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Fig. 1. Threat model for dynamic camouflaging based IP protection. Green and red blocks represent trusted and untrusted entities, respectively. Gate
replacement involves selective replacement of gates in the original netlist with polymorphic spin gates. ATPG stands for automatic test pattern generation.
Prior work using programmable CMOS for IP protection
leverage reconfigurable logic barriers [21] and reconfigurable
key gates [22]. These techniques do not use polymorphism
and fix the key bits. Randomly-triggered dynamic key ob-
fuscation has been proposed in [23]. This scheme requires
additional circuitry to alter the key, which is potentially
prone to removal attacks. Another study leverages hot-carrier
injection (HCI) to program threshold-voltage-based CMOS
gates after fabrication [24]. However, they do not support run-
time reconfiguration and suffer from large PPA overheads.
Run-time polymorphism (and hence dynamic camouflaging)
is difficult to implement in CMOS owing to fundamental limits
of CMOS devices. Our scheme enables a radically different
solution, wherein we use the unique properties of spin devices
to achieve truly polymorphic chips. This is particularly useful
for error-tolerant applications such as image processing [25].
We argue that dynamic camouflaging is also promising for
approximate computing, as dynamic camouflaging introduces
errors inherently (See Sec. III-E).
The contributions of this work are four-fold:
1) Develop dynamic camouflaging using the inherent func-
tional polymorphism of spin devices;
2) Counter IP piracy across the IC supply chain (untrusted
foundry, test facility, and end-user). We demonstrate
resilience to state-of-the-art SAT and test attacks and
discuss the implications of side-channel attacks;
3) Show the benefits of dynamic camouflaging in error-
tolerant applications such as image processing;
4) Summarize the superior layout-level cost in terms of
power, performance, and area (PPA) of the approach in
contrast to other spin-based camouflaging schemes.
II. DYNAMIC CAMOUFLAGING: WORKING PRINCIPLE
The spin device considered in this study is the magneto-
electric spin-orbit (MESO) device, whose operation is based
on the phenomena of magneto-electric (ME) switching [26]
and inverse spin-orbit effects [27]. The schematic of the MESO
device implementing different Boolean functions is shown in
Fig. 2. The inputs/outputs are electric currents and the logical
information is encoded as the direction of the current flow. A
detailed description can be found in [14].
During the writing phase, an input electric current flowing
in the ±yˆ direction through the non-magnetic interconnect
sets up an electric field in the ±zˆ direction within the ME
capacitor (red in Fig. 2). The resulting ME field switches the
magnetization state of the ferromagnet (purple) along the ±xˆ
direction. Information is written into the MESO device by
transducing the input electric current into the magnetization
state of the device. After the writing process is complete
(which takes ∼ 200 ps), the supply voltages V + and V − are
turned on to initiate the reading phase.
In the reading phase, a spin-polarized current is injected
into the spin-orbit coupling layer, which converts the spin
current into electrical current at the output node (Iout), due to
the inverse spin-Hall and Rashba-Edelstein effects [28]. The
direction of the output current is determined by the polarity of
the supply voltages V +/V − applied on the nanomagnet, and
the magnetization state of the nanomagnet.
By switching the polarity of the supply voltages, we can
implement a buffer (BUF) or an inverter (INV) using the same
device (Fig. 2(a,b)). Further, we can implement complex gates
such as majority logic, by leveraging the additive nature of
the input signals. As shown in Fig. 2(c,d), A and B are the
inputs and X is the tie-breaking control input. The polarity
of X decides the mode of operation of the MESO gate. Here,
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Fig. 2. (a-h) Implementation of INV, BUF, AND, OR, NAND, NOR, XOR, XNOR with a single MESO device, using different input configurations. Signals
A and B are logic inputs, and X is a control input required for some functionalities. Note that INV, BUF, XOR, and XNOR gates have dummy wires/contacts
at their input terminals, to make them optically indistinguishable from other implementations. (i) Generic MESO gate with peripheral MUXes, which dictate
the input and control signals through key bits. This generic structure implements any of the Boolean gates in (a-h) once the appropriate key is provided.
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Fig. 3. (a) Timing waveforms for MESO-based AND/OR/NAND/NOR gates
from behavioral Verilog models of the MESO device. The function morphs
based on the value of the control signal X . The first output signal involves
setting the top MESO terminal as “V −” and the bottom terminal as ‘V +”.
The converse is true for the bottom output signal. (b) MESO adder/subtractor
highlighting the capabilities for random functional reconfiguration. The XOR
and AND gates are implemented as static MESO gates and the INV/BUF is a
polymorphic MESO gate whose function is derived from control signals (K1
and K2) from a TRNG. A and B are the inputs, S is sum, D is difference, Ca
is carry, and Bo is borrow. Dummy contacts are omitted for simplicity.
for X = −I , it realizes an AND gate and for X = +I , it
realizes an OR gate. To implement NAND and NOR gates, the
polarities of the supply voltages are flipped (Fig. 2(e,f)). For
XOR and XNOR gates, the tie-breaking input X is eliminated,
and one signal is provided at the input terminal. The other
input signal is encoded in the voltage domain and applied
directly at the V +/V − terminals (Fig. 2(g,h)).
The MESO device with peripheral circuitry is shown in
Fig. 2(i). A timing diagram showing the functional reconfig-
uration between AND/OR and NAND/NOR, on flipping the
control signal X , is shown in Fig. 3(a). The key bits deciding
the input and control signals can either be derived from a
control block or from a true random number generator (TRNG)
(Fig. 3(b)), if random reconfiguration is applicable, e.g., for
error-tolerant applications. Configuring the MESO device via
different supply voltages and electric currents allows us to
dynamically implement all basic Boolean gates at run-time
within a single structure.
III. SECURITY ANALYSIS
A. Threat model
An adversary seeks to decipher the design IP and has various
opportunities to launch attacks. We assume that the foundry,
the test facility, and the end-user are all untrustworthy (Fig. 1).
(1) A malevolent employee in the foundry has access to the
design, including material and layout parameters of the
MESO gates and the chip interconnects. Prior camouflag-
ing schemes have trusted the foundry to implement their
device/circuit-level obfuscation, while we do not require
a trusted foundry for our scheme. Defending against an
untrusted foundry is an achievement by itself.
(2) An untrusted test facility has all test patterns and
corresponding responses. Test patterns can compromise
logic locking and static camouflaging because they are
generated to maximize fault coverage and this inherently
exposes internal circuit details [4]–[6].
(3) An untrusted end-user has the know-how to RE a chip.
He/she can mount analytical attacks such as [2], [3]
to decipher the IP obtained from RE. Further, he/she
can apply side-channel attacks [29]. Consistent with the
prior art, he/she cannot invasively probe. Hence, probing
individual wires or MESO gates is not possible.1
We assess the security guarantees offered by dynamic
camouflaging by evaluating all these threat scenarios. We then
present a case study of dynamic camouflaging for approximate
computing, wherein we demonstrate the inherent trade-off
between accuracy and resilience against RE attacks.
B. Untrusted foundry
The design house can either provide a fully-camouflaged
layout composed of MESO devices or a camouflaged layout,
where selected CMOS gates are replaced by MESO gates.2
The proportion of the design that is camouflaged by a de-
signer depends on the scope of application and impact on
PPA overheads. An attacker in the foundry can RE the IP
implemented in CMOS whereas the MESO gates appear as
black boxes without any fixed functionality. While a foundry-
based adversary can readily obtain the dimensions and material
composition of the nanomagnet in each MESO gate (and hence
understand its magnetic properties including saturation magne-
tization, energy barrier, and critical ME field for switching),
these design details do not leak any information about the
intended function of the gate. This is because MESO gates
are configured post-fabrication. In contrast, CMOS gates have
a fixed function once fabricated (static camouflaging). Re-
cently, attacks exploiting an untrusted foundry have been pro-
posed [32], [33], where no activated working chip is leveraged
as an oracle; this contrasts with SAT attacks which require a
working oracle. Having no access to the attacks [32], [33], we
refrain from a comprehensive study, but since our approach
relies on post-fabrication reconfigurability, it is intuitive to
note that our scheme is resilient to such attacks. Assuming
the end-user is also untrusted, besides dynamic camouflaging,
one can also apply large-scale static camouflaging to thwart
analytical SAT attacks [18], [34], [35].
C. Untrusted test facility
An attacker in a test facility, with access to the test patterns
and responses (generated and supplied by the design house),
1Shielding can be applied as an additional measure [30].
2Hybrid spin-CMOS designs have been realized in prior works [31].
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Fig. 4. Dynamic reconfiguration of gate X4 in a representative circuit. Circuit
implementing f1 is the original template and f2, f3 are the morphed versions.
4TABLE II
STATISTICS OF BENCHMARKS. THE ATTACK SUCCESS RATE OF HackTest IS REPORTED AS THE PERCENTAGE OF KEY BITS INFERRED BY THE ATTACK FOR
STATIC AND DYNAMIC CAMOUFLAGING. TEST PATTERNS ARE GENERATED BY Tetramax ATPG FOR 100% FAULT COVERAGE.
Benchmark Original [7] (3 functions) [17] (4 functions) [18], [36] (16 functions) [8], Proposed (8 functions)
Test Patterns Inputs Outputs Gates Camouflaged Gates Static Dynamic Static Dynamic Static Dynamic Static Dynamic
b14 469 275 245 4,125 350 59.21 17.06 38.56 18.08 18.45 7.92 28.92 17.56
b15 1 811 485 449 6,978 350 20.26 4.65 20.52 3.38 15.21 0.71 15.34 2.55
b20 896 522 512 9,226 350 56.43 15.36 40.80 12.10 20.86 4.39 20.19 11.63
b22 1,355 767 757 14,457 350 55.81 16.17 63.03 10.92 21.62 4.25 34.23 8.63
Average N/A N/A N/A N/A 350 47.92 13.31 40.73 11.12 19.04 4.32 24.67 10.09
can jeopardize the IP security, thwarting logic locking and IC
camouflaging. ATPG algorithms are designed to maximize the
fault coverage with minimum test data and in doing so, these
test patterns leak the internal circuit structure [4]–[6].
In logic locking where pre-test activation is performed
(i.e., test patterns are generated with the correct key), such
an approach is vulnerable to hill-climbing [4] and test-data
mining attacks [5]. For static camouflaging, the functionality
of logic gates cannot be configured post-fabrication and hence
test patterns are always generated for the correct assignment of
camouflaged gates. This vulnerability is leveraged in HackTest
to reveal the identity of camouflaged gates within minutes [6].
MESO-based dynamic camouflaging circumvents this threat
by allowing post-test configuration. The fabricated IC is con-
figured with an incorrect I/O mapping and functionality.3 This
is equivalent to loading a locked IC with an incorrect key. The
reconfigured IC and test data are then send to the test facility.
An attacker ends up with an incorrect IP by mounting the
test data mining attack on the IC. After testing, before being
deployed in the market, the MESO gates are reconfigured (by
the design house) to reflect the true, intended functionality.
Even if the chips are configured prior to test, dynamic
camouflaging provides superior resilience compared to static
camouflaging. To model an adversary in the test facility, we
implement HackTest [6], with identical setup details. We cam-
ouflage a fixed set of gates (64/128 gates were camouflaged
in [6]) using various camouflaging schemes and execute the
attacks for static and dynamic camouflaging for 72 hours. Each
experiment is repeated 10 times and the findings are reported
in Table II. We observe that (i) as the number of functions
that a camouflaged gate can implement increases, there is a
reduction in the attack success rate, and (ii) the attack success
rate for dynamic camouflaging is lower when compared to
static camouflaging. For larger ITC-99 benchmarks like b17 1,
3Testing for structural defects does not require the chip to be functional.
The chip is configured to any function and tested with no loss in test quality.
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Output for different key combinations  Inference 
k0 k1 k2 k3 k4 k5 k6 k7 
000 001 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 1 
001 001 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 1 
010 001 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 1 
011 100 f2 1 0 0 1 1 0 1 0 iter 2: k0, k3, k4, k6 pruned 
100 001 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 1 
101 100 f1 0 1 0 1 1 0 1 0 iter 1: k0, k2, k5, k7 pruned 
110 111 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
111 111 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Fig. 5. SAT attack [2] on the polymorphic circuit of Fig. 4. For k0 and k1,
the INV and BUF operations performed on the output of X2.
b18, and b19, the attack success rate is close to 0% (for both
cases). The attack success rate is related to (i) size of the
benchmark, (ii) number and type of camouflaged gates, and
(iii) number of functions implemented by a camouflaged gate.
D. Untrusted end-user
A hostile end-user with sophisticated RE equipment, SAT
algorithms, and computational resources may circumvent the
IP protection employed by a design house. However, dynamic
camouflaging has the potential to thwart such an attacker right
in his/her tracks. We illustrate dynamic camouflaging through
a conceptual example; consider the circuit implementing f1
(majority-of-inputs) in Fig. 4. Initially, the circuit is configured
with gate X4 performing a NAND operation. Subsequently,
X4 morphs into NOR and then into XNOR. Here, X4 is the
sole camouflaged (and polymorphic) gate with three key bits
determining its function. Assuming a key distribution such that
INV, BUF, AND, OR, NAND, NOR, XOR, and XNOR gates
correspond to key bits {000, 001, ...., 111} respectively, the
dynamic key of the circuit cycles from 100 to 101, and then
to 111 as per the outlined reconfiguration in Fig. 4. Application
of the SAT attack [2] for this scenario is explained below.
Consider that the oracle implements f1 during the first itera-
tion of the SAT solver, where the input applied is 101 (Fig. 5).
The SAT solver is oblivious to the function being active in any
iteration. The first iteration prunes key combinations k0, k2, k5,
and k7. While this is happening, the gate X4 morphs into
NOR and the oracle is now implementing function f2. In the
second iteration, the input pattern 100 eliminates keys k3, k4,
and k6. Thereafter, the SAT solver concludes that the correct
key bit and identity of gate X4 are 001 and BUF, respectively.
In this way, dynamic camouflaging deceives the SAT solver
to converge to an incorrect key, leading to an incorrect gate
assignment. Thus, the IP is protected against analytical RE.
As for physical RE, the interconnect fabric which routes the
control signals to the MESO gates has to be resilient against
probing. Shielding may deter probing [30].
For error-tolerant applications, the circuit may also be
randomly reconfigured by deriving the control signals of the
MESO gates from a TRNG (recall Fig. 3(b)). Removal attack
targeting the TRNG will result in floating control lines for the
MESO gates, leading to noisy outputs and loss of functionality.
Advanced attacks directed at distorting the entropy of the
TRNG to change its bias [37] are out-of-scope for this study.
To evaluate the resilience of run-time polymorphism, we
extend the open-source framework from [38] to execute SAT
attacks on polymorphic versions of ITC-99 benchmarks. Even
for 100,000 runs, the attacks fail due to inconsistent I/O
5mappings, which induce an unsatisfiable (UNSAT) scenario
for the SAT attack [2]. The primitive is modeled as per the
methodology outlined in [35]; each MESO gate with inputs A
and B with control signal X is modeled as an 8-to-1 MUX
with three select lines. The select lines represent the “key
bits”,4 and allow the SAT solver to select one of the eight
possible functions at a time.
E. Case study of image processing IP
To show how dynamic camouflaging can protect approx-
imate circuits, we design a cellular neural network (CeNN)
using MESO gates, as shown in Fig. 6. We use the same
methodology for its construction as the all spin logic (ASL)-
based spintronic CeNN in [39], using parameters for the
MESO device from [14]. Fig. 6 shows the connectivity of
cells in the CeNN, and the transient switching of a MESO
CeNN cell. The central MESO device is connected to eight
other MESO devices in a 3 × 3 grid. The inset of Fig. 6(b)
depicts the CeNN templates {A, B, I} used for simple image
reconstruction.5 In contrast to [39], there is no voltage-to-
current transduction between CeNN cells since the output of
the MESO device remains in the current domain.
We investigate the implications of attacking an approximate
image processing IP with AppSAT [3]. Approximate circuits
are vulnerable to such attacks since the attacker can recover a
functionally-similar IP. To safeguard the MESO-based CeNN
against AppSAT, we use run-time polymorphism for dynamic
reconfiguration (as shown in Fig. 4). This implies that the
image processing IP works at sub-optimal accuracy, depend-
ing on the Hamming distance (HD) between the different
morphing circuit templates (f1, f2, and f3 in Fig. 4). By
tuning this HD through system level design (selecting gates
that need to be polymorphic) one can control how similar the
IP recovered by AppSAT is, when compared to the original
IP. The HD between the polymorphic templates inside the
original IP, which decides the accuracy at the system level,
4Dynamic camouflaging does not require “key bits” as opposed to logic
locking. We use the notion of keys to illustrate conceptual equivalence of the
scheme with logic locking [35] and to assess the attack frameworks [2], [3].
5These templates represent the weights of synapses connecting adjacent
cells of the CeNN.
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Fig. 6. MESO-based CeNN for image reconstruction. Each cell in the network
is implemented by a MESO device. (b) Magnetization vs. time shows the
switching of the central MESO CeNN cell, when inputs from its nearest
neighbor cells are applied. The switching delay is ∼ 200 ps. The MESO
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templates {A,B, I} used to configure the CeNN.
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Fig. 7. (a) Original input image to the MESO-based CeNN image reconstruc-
tion. (b-e) Images reconstructed with approximate IP of the CeNN recovered
from AppSAT, for HD of 10%, 15%, 20% and 25% respectively between
AppSAT-recovered IP and the original IP. This HD is different from the
accuracy of the approximate circuit. (See also Table III below.)
is different from the HD between the AppSAT-recovered IP
and the original IP.
Since CAD tools and synthesizable Verilog models for
emerging spin devices like MESO are at a nascent stage in
the research community, we perform simulations on ITC-99
benchmarks. In experiments on b14 benchmark, a ∼ 11%
HD between polymorphic templates translates to ∼ 28%
HD between the AppSAT-recovered IP and the original IP
(Table III). In Table III, templates 1-3 are approximate versions
of each benchmark, with their respective HD from the original
design. We execute AppSAT (setup details same as in [3])
considering that the benchmark morphs between its original
form and three approximate templates. AppSAT provides an
approximate-key after time-out unlike the SAT attack [2].
Using this approximate key, we calculate the HD between the
AppSAT-recovered IP and the original IP, which is quoted in
the last column.
TABLE III
COMPARISON OF HD (IN %) BETWEEN VARIOUS POLYMORPHIC
TEMPLATES AND ORIGINAL FUNCTION, AND HD INFERRED BETWEEN
AppSAT RECOVERED IP AND ORIGINAL IP. HD IS CALCULATED USING
Synopsys VCS FOR 100,000 PATTERNS.
Benchmark HD from the original design HD inferred
template-1 template-2 template-3 after AppSAT
b14 11.22 9.26 13.78 28.81
b15 1 12.35 9.62 12.88 32.15
b17 1 11.14 10.62 15.24 36.22
b20 12.51 14.37 17.86 34.34
The image reconstructed by the CeNN at various represen-
tative values of HD between the AppSAT-recovered IP and
the original IP is shown in Fig. 7. As seen in Fig. 7(e), at a
sufficiently large HD of 25%, the AppSAT-recovered IP fails
to faithfully reconstruct the original image.6 For the AppSAT-
recovered IPs incurring an even larger HD in Table III, the
reconstructed image will naturally be more noisy.
There is a clear trade-off between the accuracy of the
original IP and the resilience to AppSAT attacks, in terms
of how closely AppSAT is able to resolve the original IP.
However, for approximate applications like image processing,
which can tolerate a certain degree of error, our scheme can
thwart any attempts to recover even an approximate version of
the IP. Advanced IP protection mechanisms based on point-
6Machine learning algorithms may be able to even decipher the blurred
images reconstructed using AppSAT-recovered IPs with large HDs. However,
this will not aid an attacker in obtaining a better approximation of the original
IP in hardware, which is the scope of the current protection scheme. A detailed
study is reserved for future work.
6functions [9], [11] and stripping of functionality [12] may not
be suitable for protecting error-tolerant systems, such as the
image processing IP considered in this work. That is because
these techniques trade-off output corruptibility for SAT-attack
resilience; the lower the output corruptibility, the stronger the
resilience.
Attacks working on the notion of recovering an approximate
version of the protected IP (e.g., AppSAT) are thereby able to
successfully recover a satisfactorily functional similar IP if
protected using [9], [11], [12]. Also, dynamic reconfiguration
at run-time cannot protect systems which demand accurate and
error-free computations, for e.g., cryptographic applications.
F. Side-channel attacks
Side-channel attacks exploiting the electromagnetic (EM)
radiation traces emitted from devices have gained traction [40].
Such attacks rely on detecting the electric current-induced
magnetic field set up in the device or the interconnects.
With regards to the MESO device, the typical currents in
the interconnects are in the order of ∼10 µA. Such small
currents result in extremely minute magnetic fields of ∼10
µT, which are smaller than the earth’s magnetic field. These
fields cannot distort the magnetic moments of the ferromagnets
in the adjacent device. Hence, detecting EM traces requires
a resolution beyond the capabilities of state-of-the-art EM
probes. The MESO device is resilient to other side-channel
attacks plaguing CMOS systems, such as photonic and acous-
tic. Spin devices operate inherently differently owing to the
underlying physics, and hence are devoid of the vulnerabilities
that these attacks seek to exploit. Still, a system-level security
analysis is necessary once applications are constructed using
these devices.
G. Layout analysis
The baseline designs are implemented in CMOS leverag-
ing the NangateOpenCellLibrary [41] using Cadence Innovus
18.1. The PPA numbers assume a simple replacement of all
CMOS gates with MESO gates.7 We use PPA numbers from
respective publications for a comparative study (Table IV).
The PPA metrics for the MESO device are 0.04 µW, 200
ps and 0.0014 µm2 respectively [14]. ASL and giant spin-
Hall effect (GSHE)-based [18], [42] full-chip camouflaging
incur excessive power and timing overheads. MESO-based
camouflaging offers substantial PPA reductions relative to
these spin devices and are expected to be even better when
compared to CMOS-based camouflaging [7]–[9].
IV. CONCLUSION
Functional polymorphism for IP protection has been largely
unexplored in the context of securing hardware. We present
dynamic camouflaging as a design-for-trust technique, based
on the foundations of run-time polymorphism and post-
fabrication reconfigurability exhibited by emerging spin-based
7This is reasonable as custom libraries and physical-design files for spin-
based devices are not widely available as it is an area of active research.
Besides, commercial CAD vendors like Synopsys and Cadence do not readily
support system-level simulations of emerging spin devices.
TABLE IV
PPA COMPARISON OF ASL-BASED [42], GSHE-BASED [18] AND
MESO-BASED FULL-CHIP CAMOUFLAGING FOR ITC-99 BENCHMARKS.
ABSOLUTE NUMBERS ARE REPORTED.
Benchmark ASL-based [42] GSHE-based [18] MESO-based
A(µm2) P(mW) D(ns) A(µm2) P(mW) D(ns) A(µm2) P(mW) D(ns)
b14 444 1,554 62.9 6.6 0.9 62 5.9 0.2 8
b15 1 715.7 2,509 58.6 11.2 1.5 58.9 9.9 0.3 7.6
b17 1 2,215 7,765 62.6 34.4 4.6 63.6 30.7 0.9 8.2
b18 6,401 22,428 182.2 101.4 13.5 192.2 90.3 2.5 24.8
b19 12,862 45,066 169.7 208.3 27.7 128.1 185.5 5.2 16.6
b20 1,002 3,508 94.8 14.8 1.9 74.4 13.1 0.4 9.6
b22 1,543 5,403 99.3 23.1 3.1 55.8 20.6 0.6 7.2
devices. We harness this unique attribute of spin devices,
specifically the MESO switch, to implement a scheme which
thwarts state-of-the-art SAT attacks by transforming the func-
tional I/O mapping of the chip on-the-fly, misleading SAT
algorithms to converge to a false assignment. Dynamic cam-
ouflaging can secure the supply chain end to end, including
foundry, test facility, and end-user. Securing error-tolerant IP,
such as image processors, is shown to be a suitable application
for dynamic camouflaging. MESO-based full-chip camou-
flaging offers savings of 7,439×, 5.88×, and 73× in PPA
respectively compared to ASL-based camouflaging. Compared
to GSHE-based camouflaging, the savings are 5×, 4.8×, and
1.1× in PPA respectively. This is because the polymorphic
MESO device consumes significantly lower switching energy
(on the order of ∼10 atto Joules) than other spin devices, due
to its energy-efficient electric-field-driven reversal.
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